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LEGISLATING THROUGH THE USE OF
COMMENTARY: THE SENTENCING
COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION
OF § 994(h) OF THE SENTENCING
REFORM ACT
United States v. LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. 1673 (1997)
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. LaBonte,' the United States Supreme Court
held that 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) unambiguously requires a court,
when sentencing a third-time drug or violent felon, to impose
the maximum prison term available for the offense of convic-
tion, including all applicable statutory enhancements.2 As a re-
sult, the Court invalidated the United States Sentencing
Commission's promulgation of commentary added by Amend-
ment 506, which instructed sentencing courts to apply unen-
hanced statutory maximums when sentencing career offenders.3
This Note concludes that, while the Court reached the correct
outcome, its analysis overlooked an important procedural error
in the Commission's adoption of Amendment 506.4 First, this
Note establishes that the commentary added by Amendment
506 is not a permissible function of Sentencing Guidelines
commentary.5 Next, it argues that the Court's application of the
Stinson standard6 to determine whether Amendment 506 is bind-
'117 S. Ct. 1673 (1997).
2d1 at 1675.
SId.; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELNES MANUAL § 4131.1, cmt., n.2 (1994) [hereinafter
USSG].
See infra notes 161-67 and accompanying text.
See USSG § lB1.7 (specifying that the three permissible functions are to (1) "in-
terpret the guideline or explain how it is to be applied," (2) "suggest circumstances
which ... may warrant departure from the guidelines," and (3) "provide background
information, including factors considered in promulgating the guideline or reasons
underlying promulgation of the guideline").
6 Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993) (holding that commentary that
"interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution
or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of that
guideline").
anrl
28 U.S. C. § 994(h)
ing on federal judges was incorrect.7 Stinson's holding is limited
to commentary that interprets guidelines.8 Given that Amend-
ment 506 interprets a federal statute9 rather than a guideline, it
falls outside of Stinson's purview10
Further, this Note contends that application of the Chevron
standard to determine whether Amendment 506 binds federal
judges also would be incorrect. 1 The Chevron standard applies
to guidelines, not commentary.12 This Note concludes that
Amendment 506 is invalid, irrespective of its plausibility or the
Sentencing Reform Act's ambiguity. 3  Finally, this Note dis-
cusses the long-term implications of the Court's failure to ad-
dress the Commission's use of commentary to legislate. 4
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1984
Prior to 1984, a three-way sharing of federal sentencing re-
sponsibilities existed among Congress, federal judges, and the
federal parole board. 5 Congress passed statutes specifying
maximum penalties for crimes, judges had discretion in decid-
ing what sentence to impose, and the federal parole board-an
agency within the executive branch-determined the actual du-
ration of imprisonment. 6 As a result, similar offenders often
served vastly different terms for similar crimes, depending upon
the particular sentencing judge and parole board. 7
In response to widespread criticism of this indeterminate
and uncertain sentencing system, Congress implemented the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the Act) 8 In addition to abol-
7LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. at 1677.
" Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38.
9 See LaBonte 117 S. Ct. at 1677, 1680.
10 See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38.
" See Chevron U.S., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1988) (establishing the degree of judicial deference owed to federal
agency rules).
1 Stinson, 508 U.S. at 44-45.
"ILaBont, 117 S. Ct. at 1677.
,4 See infra Part V.D.
" Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1989) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of the Sentencing Reform Act).
Id. at 365.
'17 i.
'a See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1994).
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ishing parole,' 9 mandating determinate sentences,20 and author-
izing limited appellate review,21 the Act consolidated the sen-
tencingjudge and Parole Commissioner's powers in the United
States Sentencing Commission (the Commission)2 Congress
directed the Commission to formulate federal sentencing guide-
lines that would balance Congress' general goals of "reduction
of disparity, proportionality and administrability. ' '23 The Com-
mission, an eight-member independent body within the judicial
branch,24 attempted to implement these "sometimes conflict-
ing'' 5 goals through its promulgation of the United States Sen-
tencing Guidelines.26
B. UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES
1. General Methodology
In the Sentencing Reform Act, Congress directed the
Commission to "promulgate and distribute to all courts of the
United States... guidelines... for use of a sentencing court in
determining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal case."27
The Sentencing Guidelines, the product of this directive, estab-
lish determinate sentencing ranges that reflect a federal crimi-
nal offender's prior criminal record and offense
28
characteristics. Pursuant to the Guidelines, ajudge determines
19 Id.
20 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624(a)-(b) (1994).
21 Id. §§ 3742(a)-(b).
28 U.S.C. §§ 991,994, 995(a) (1) (1994).
22 United States v. LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. 1673, 1687 (1997). See also 28 U.S.C. § 994
(1994).
2'4 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1994). The Commission is an "independent commission in
the judicial branch," comprised of seven voting members (appointed by the President
"by and with the advice and consent of the Senate"), and one non-voting member
(the Attorney General or her designee). Id. No more than four may belong to the
same political party, and at least three must be federal judges. Id. Voting members
serve six-year terms, id. §§ 992(a)-(b), and the President may remove members "only
for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for other good cause shown." Id. §
991 (a).
25 LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. at 1680 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
228 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1994).27 Id.
28 Id § 994(b) (1). This format is the result of the Sentencing Reform Act's direc-
tive to the Commission to create categories of offense behavior and offender charac-
teristics, and to establish sentencing ranges "for each category of offense involving
each category of defendant." Id.
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a federal offender's sentence through a three-step process.'
First, following conviction, the sentencing judge assigns the of-
fender one of six "criminal history categories," which reflects
the offender's prior criminal record, and one of forty-three "of-
fense levels," which accounts for particular offense characteris-
tics.3° The Guidelines direct the judge as to the appropriate
"category" and "level."3' Second, the judge consults the sentenc-
ing table, a grid composed of forty-three rows (offense levels)
and six columns (criminal history categories) .12 The intersec-
tion of the offender's category and level specifies a range of
months of imprisonment. Finally, the judge sentences the of-
fender within the range, unless there exists an "aggravating or
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not ade-
quately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission
in formulating the guidelines. ' 4 Should this occur, the judge
has the "departure authority" to sentence outside of the range
through either downward or upward departures.
2. Career Offender Methodology
While Congress granted the Sentencing Commission broad
discretion in establishing sentencing ranges for federal offend-
ers, it expressly limited this discretion with respect to sentencing
"career offenders. 's Section 994(h) of the Sentencing Reform
29 LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. at 1680.
USSG § 1B1.1.
Id First, the judge assigns the offender a "base offense level," based on the of-
fense of conviction. Id. Chapter Two of the Guidelines specifies these base levels, in-
cluding, for example, first degree murder (base level 43), id. § 2A.I, second degree
murder (base level 33), id. § 2A1.2, and voluntary manslaughter (base level 25), id. §
2A1.3. The judge then adjusts the base level upward or downward for certain aggra-
vating or mitigating features of the crime ("specific offense characteristics"). Id. §
1B1.1. For example, the judge increases the base level by two levels if the victim was
'unusually vulnerable," id. § 3AI.1, and by three levels if the victim was a Government
or law enforcement officer, id. § 3A1.2. There are also "role in the offense" adjust-
ments and "mitigating role" adjustments. Id. § 3B1.2.
The judge determines the offender's "criminal history category" by adding up her
total "points" specified in Chapter Four of the Guidelines. Id. § 4Al.1.
"I- § 5A (tbl.).
"Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994).
3Id.
28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (1994). A defendant is a "career offender" if-
(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time of the instant offense,
(2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or
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Act directs the Commission to assure that the Guidelines specify
prison sentences "at or near the maximum term authorized for
categories" of adult offenders convicted of their third felony vio-
lent crime or drug offense. In response, the Commission
promulgated the Career Offender Guideline, which dictates the
method for assigning a "career offender's" criminal history
category and offense level.ss Specifically, the Guideline instructs
the sentencing judge to assign a career offender a criminal his-
tory category of VI (the highest level), and to identify the of-
fender's "offense statutory maximum" in order to set his offense
level.3 9 The judge then consults the sentencing table to deter-
mine the applicable range.4 O
TABLE 1
CAREER OFFENDER GUIDELINES
Offense Statutory Minimum Offense Level*
(A) Life 37
(B) 25 years or more 34
(C) 20 years or more 32(D) 15 years or more, but less than 20 years 29
(E) 10 years or more, but less than 15 years 24
(F) 5 years or more, but less than 10 years 17
(G) More than 1 year, but less than 5 years 12
a controlled substance offense, and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony
convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.
USSG § 4B1.1.
" 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (1994). Specifically, the directive provides:
The Commission shall assure that the guidelines specify a sentence to a term of
imprisonment at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of defen-
dants'in which the defendant is eighteen years old or older and [(1) has been




"Id- Absent the Career Offender Guideline, the offense itself-rather than the
penalty associated with it-would determine the offense level.
'0 Id. § 5A (tbl.).
* If an adjustment from § 3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility) applies, decrease
the offense level by the number of levels corresponding to that adjustment.
1998] 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) 911
C. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, POLICY STATEMENTS, AND
COMMENTARY
The Guidelines Manual consists of three kinds of text:
guidelines; policy statements; and commentary.4 1
1. Guidelines
As noted previously, guidelines direct the sentencing court
as to the appropriate type of punishment and length of sen-
tence to impose in a federal criminal case.42 Guidelines are con-
stitutional under Mistretta v. United States.
43
The Sentencing Commission's promulgation of guidelines
is equivalent to an administrative agency's promulgation of "leg-
islative rules."4 That is, guidelines are the product of an "ex-
press congressional delegation of authority for rulemaking,"
45
and represent the Commission's interpretation of the federal
statute it administers (the Sentencing Reform Act).46 Addition-
ally, Congress subjects both guidelines and legislative rules to
review and scrutiny prior to their becoming law. Similar to leg-
islative rules, Congress subjects guidelines to the "notice and
comment" provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.48
"Notice and comment" requires the promulgating agency to
give public notice of its proposed rulemaking and allow for pub-
lic comment.49 If the agency decides to promulgate the rules af-
4' Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 41 (1993). See also 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)
(1994) (directing the Commission to promulgate guidelines and policy statements).
42 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of the Sentencing
Commission and the Sentencing Guidelines). Petitioner Mistretta-who had been
sentenced under the Guidelines to 18 months imprisonment for conspiracy to dis-
tribute cocaine-claimed that the Commission was constituted in violation of separa-
tion of powers, and that Congress had delegated excessive authority to the
Commission to structure the Guidelines. Id. at 370. In an opinion authored by Jus-
tice Blackmun, the Court held that, in creating the Sentencing Commission, "Con-
gress neither delegated excessive legislative power nor upset the constitutionally
mandated balance of powers among the coordinate Branches." Id. at 412. Specifi-
cally, Justice Blackmun concluded that the Constitution does not prohibit Congress
from "delegating to an expert body located within the Judicial Branch the intricate
task of formulating sentencing guidelines consistent with such significant statutory
direction as is present here." Id.
"Stinson, 508 U.S. at 45.
' Id. at 44.
46 id
4 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1994); 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)-(c) (1994).
28 U.S.C. § 994(x) (1994); 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)-(c) (1994).
49 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)-(c) (1994).
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ter receiving the comments, it must set forth the rule's basis and
purpose in a public statement.50 To further assure accountabil-
ity, Congress requires the Sentencing Commission to submit
proposed guidelines (and amendments), accompanied by ex-
planatory statements, to Congress itself.51 The guidelines auto-
matically take effect 180 days after submission, unless Congress
modifies or disapproves them.5'
Given these similarities, the Supreme Court has extended
the two-part standard governing the degree of judicial defer-
ence owed to legislative rules, to guidelines. 3 Under this stan-
dard, guidelines are binding on judges if (1) the congressional
authorizing statute is "silent or ambiguous" on the pertinent is-
sue, and (2) the Commission's interpretation is based on a per-
missible construction of the statute.54
2. Policy Statements
In addition to guidelines, the Sentencing Reform Act di-
rects the Commission to adopt "general policy statements re-
garding application of the guidelines or any other aspect of
sentencing... [that] would further the purposes" of the Act. 
5
Policy statements are binding on federal judges, 6 and amend-
ments thereof are not subject to congressional review.
50 Ia
5,28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1994).
52 m
53 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1991). The specific language of the standard is as follows:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter..
. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the pre-
cise question at issue, the.., question for the court is whether the agency's answer
is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
Id.
54 Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44 (1993) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at
842-43).
5' 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2) (1994).
56 Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 201 (1992) (holding that failure to fol-
low a policy statement renders a sentence an "incorrect application" of the guidelines
and subject to reversal on appeal).
-, See 28 U.S.C. § 994(p) (1994).
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3. Commentary
Within the Guidelines Manual, both guidelines and policy
statements are accompanied by extensive commentary.5 8 Al-
though the Sentencing Reform Act does not expressly authorize
the issuance of commentary, 9 it refers to it, 6° and the Supreme
Court has endorsed its use in interpreting the guidelines.61 The
Commission has established that commentary may serve three
functions: (1) to "interpret the guideline or explain how it is to
be applied;" (2) to "suggest circumstances which ... may war-
rant departure from the guidelines;" and (3) to "provide back-
ground information, including factors considered in
promulgating the guideline or reasons underlying promulga-
tion of the guideline."62
In Stinson v. United States, the Court concluded that com-
mentary is the equivalent of an "interpretive rule," i.e., an
agency's interpretation of its own legislative rule.3 The Court
reasoned as follows: Given that guidelines are the equivalent of
legislative rules adopted by agencies, and the functional pur-
pose of commentary is to "assist in the interpretation and appli-
cation" of guidelines, "commentary is akin to an agency's
interpretation of its own legislative rules.6' Consequently, the
Court extended the standard of judicial deference owed to in-
terpretive rules to commentary, holding that commentary that
"interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it vio-
lates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with,
or a plainly erroneous reading of that guideline."'
Stinson, 508 U.S. at 41.
Id. As previously noted, see supra text accompanying notes 27 and 55, §
994(a) (1) directs the Commission to promulgate guidelines and policy statements.
28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (1) (1994). There is no such directive with respect to commentary.
' Section 3553(b) provides that, in determining whether to depart from a guide-
lines range, "the court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy state-
ments, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)
(1994).
6' Stinson, 508 U.S. at 41.
62 USSG § 1B1.7. See also Stinson, 508 U.S. at 45 (noting that "[t]he functional pur-
pose of commentary ... is to assist in the interpretation and application" of the
Commission's guidelines).
6Stinson, 508 U.S. at 44. Two additional analogies offered in an attempt to char-
acterize the commentary's legal force on judges were commentary as equivalent to
legislative history, and commentary as equivalent to an agency's legislative rule. Id. at





At issue in Stinson was the Commission's interpretation of
"crime of violence" in the Career Offender Guideline. As
noted, Congress directed the Commission to assure that the
Guidelines specified sentences at or near statutory maximums
for third-time felons convicted of drug trafficking crimes or
"crimes of violence."6 In guideline § 4B1.2, which was subject
to "notice and comment" and congressional review, the Com-
mission defined "crime of violence" as including "conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another."6 7
After a sentencing judge interpreted this definition as including
the offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, the
Commission issued commentary-via Amendment 433-specify-
ing that the definition does not include that offense.r8 The
Court upheld the amendment.
69
D. AMENDMENT 506
Following the Court's validation in Stinson of the commen-
tary interpreting the definition of "crime of violence," 70 the
Commission issued additional commentary defining the phrase
"offense statutory maximum" in the Career Offender Guide-
line.7' As previously noted, ajudge sentencing a career offender
must determine the offender's "offense statutory maximum" in
order to set his "offense level."72 While the Career Offender
Guideline does not define offense statutory maximum,73 prior
commentary specified that the phrase refers to the "maximum
term of imprisonment authorized for the offense of convic-
tion."74
28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (1994).
6I& § 4B1.2(1) (ii).
6' USSG § 4B1.2, cmt., n.2 (1992). Following promulgation of Amendment 433,
defendant Stinson sought resentencing, but the Eleventh Circuit held that federal
courts are not bound by commentary. United States v. Stinson, 957 F.2d 813, 815
(11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Stinson,
508 U.S. at 48. Observing that the commentary added by Amendment 433 "inter-
preted and explained" the Commission's guideline defining "crime of violence," the
Court equated commentary to an agency's "interpretive rule." Id. at 42-43.
69 Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38.
71 See supra note 66-69 and accompanying text.
7, USSG § 4B1.1, cmt., n.2 (1994).
' See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
7' USSG § 4B1.2. It should be noted that the Guideline does define the terms
"crime of violence," "controlled substance offense," and "two prior felony convic-
tions," but fails to define "offense statutory maximum."
7 Id. § 4B1.1, Application n.2 (Nov. 1, 1993).
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However, neither the Guideline nor its accompanying
commentary designated which "maximum term" should apply
where federal law established a basic statutory maximum for a
particular offense and also provided an enhanced statutory
maximum for repeat offenders. 5 For example, the penalty pro-
vision for the offense of possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute provides,
[S] uch person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more
than 20 years .... If any person commits such a violation after a prior
conviction for a felony drug offense has become final, such persosn shall
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 30 years .... 76
The issue in doubt was whether the judge should apply 20 or 30
years as the "offense statutory maximurf" when determining the
offender's offense level. The federal appellate courts faced with
this choice uniformly concluded that "offense statutory maxi-
mum" encompasses the enhanced maximum, i.e., 30 years. 77
In 1994, the Commission issued Amendment 506, which re-
defined the phrase "offense statutory maximum" in Career Of-
fender Guideline commentary as "the maximum term of
imprisonment authorized for the offense of conviction . . . not
including any increase in that maximum term under a sentenc-
ing enhancement that applies because of the defendant's prior
criminal record."78 In addition, the Commission opted to give
Amendment 506 retroactive effect." The Commission justified
Amendment 506 as a means of "avoiding unwarranted double-
counting as well as unwarranted disparity associated with varia-
7' Id. Imposition of the enhanced penalty requires the Government to file an in-
formation notifying the defendant in advance of trial that it will rely on his prior con-
victions to seek a penalty enhancement. 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) (1994). If the
Government does not file notice, the lower sentencing range will be applied. Id.
7621 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (1994).
' See United States v. Smith, 984 F.2d 1084, 1087 (10th Cir. 1993) (upholding the
district court's calculation of the defendant's sentencing range using the enhanced
statutory maximum), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 873 (1993); United States v. Garrett, 959
F.2d 1005, 1009-11 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that application of the Guidelines' ca-
reer offender provision to the heightened maximum "does not add to the penalty
authorized by Congress because it did not increase Garrett's sentence beyond the
maximum authorized by subsection 841(b) (1) (B)"); United States v. Amis, 926 F.2d
328, 329-30 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that the defendant, whose conviction for drug of-
fenses was subject to statutory enhancement, could also be treated as a career of-
fender); United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 558-60 (9th Cir. 1989)
(holding that there is no impermissible double enhancement in the careqr offender
provision of the Sentencing Guidelines).
78 USSG § 4.B1.1, Application n.2 (1994) (emphasis added).
" Id. This authority is pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(u) (1994).
1998] 915
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tions in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in seeking en-
hanced penalties based on prior convictions."80 Additionally,
the Commission noted that the laws providing enhanced maxi-
mum sentences for repeat drug offenders did not exist at the
time of the Sentencing Reform Act's enactment.8'
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The United States District Court for the District of Maine
convicted George LaBonte, Alfred Lawrence Hunnewell and
Steven Dyer of possession of controlled substances with intent to
distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a) (1).82 Based on their
prior felony drug convictions, the prosecution filed timely no-
tice under § 851 of its intention to seek enhanced penalties. 83
As a result, the court classified each as a "career offender," and
calculated sentences according to the Career Offender Guide-
line.84
In accordance with the Guideline, the district court identi-
fied each offender's offense statutory maximum to determine
his offense level.85 In each case, the court used the enhanced
maximum, thirty years, as the offense statutory maximum.86 Ac-
cordingly, the court assigned each offender a preliminary of-
80 USSG § 4B1.1, cmt., n.2 (1994) (Background).
Id.
82 United States v. LaBonte, 70 F.3d. 1396, 1402-03 (1st Cir. 1995). Section 841
provides in pertinent part: "Except as otherwise authorized by this subchapter, it shall
be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally-to manufacture, distribute, or
dispense, a controlled substance." 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1994). Specifically, the district
court convicted LaBonte of one count of possession of cocaine with intent to distrib-
ute, Hunnewell of two counts of possessing controlled substances with intent to dis-
tribute, and Dyer of conspiracy to possess controlled substances with intent to
distribute. Petitioner's Brief at 7, United States v. LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. 1673 (1997)
(No. 95-1726).
8, 21 U.S.C. § 851(a) (1994).
8' LaBonte, 70 F.3d at 1402.
' Id. For the offense of possession with intent to distribute, the statute provides:
Such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 20
years .... If any person commits such a violation after a prior conviction for a fel-
ony drug offense has become final, such person shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of not more than 30 years.
21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (C) (1994).
86 LaBonte, 70 F.3d at 1402.
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fense level of 34.87 Further, pursuant to the Guideline, the court
assigned each a criminal history category of Vs 8
For LaBonte and Hunnewell, the court deducted three lev-
els for acceptance of responsibility, thereby reducing their of-
fense levels to 31.89 The intersection of level 31 and category VI
in the sentencing table produces a range of 188 to 235 months,
and the court sentenced each to 188 months imprisonment."
For respondent Dyer, the court refused an acceptance of re-
sponsibility deduction.91 Using 34 as the offense level, the court
arrived at a range of 262 to 327 months and imposed a 262
month sentence.92 In all three cases, the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the convictions and sen-
tences.3
In 1994, the year following the district court's decisions, the
Sentencing Commission redefined "offense statutory maximum"
to exclude statutory enhancements, and gave the Amendment
retroactive effect.94 LaBonte, Hunnewell and Dyer each sought
resentencing. The district court granted LaBonte's motion,
and, using its authority to retroactively apply Amendment 506,
reduced his sentence to 151 months imprisonment. 95 The Gov-
ernment appealed to the First Circuit.9
Meanwhile, a different district court judge denied Hunnew-
ell's and Dyer's motions for resentencing, concluding that the
Sentencing Commission lacked authority to adopt Amendment





9, Id. at 1403.
92.
9"LaBonte v. United States, 19 F.3d 1427 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Hunnew-
ell, 10 F.Sd 805 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Dyer, 9 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1993).
"See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
LaBonte, 70 F.3d at 1402. The judge recalculated LaBonte's sentence applying
the unenhanced maximum. The judge set LaBonte's offense level at 32, deducted
three levels for acceptance of responsibility, and arrived at a range of 151 to 188
months.
97 See . at 1403 (discussing the denial of these motions).93Ia
19981 917
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The First Circuit consolidated the LaBonte, Hunnewell, and
Dyer appeals99 Applying the two-prong Chevron standard,'( a di-
vided panel held that Amendment 506 is a reasonable interpre-
tation of the Sentencing Reform Act's directive to designate
career offenders' sentences "at or near the maximum term
authorized" and therefore is binding on federal courts.1'
Regarding Chevron's first prong, the court concluded that §
994(h) of the Act is "ambiguous" as to the meaning of "maxi-
mum term authorized for categories of offenders."1 2 The First
Circuit reasoned that the phrase could be construed as either:
(1) the enhanced maximum applicable to the "category" of re-
peat offenders for whom the prosecution filed notice of prior
crimes; or (2) as "including all offenders (or all repeat offend-
ers) charged with transgressing the same criminal statute, re-
gardless of whether the prosecution chooses to invoke the
sentence-enhancing mechanism against a particular defen-
dant. , 0 3 Under the second construction, "maximum" refers to
the unenhanced maximum sentence.104
Given this ambiguity, the court applied Chevron's second
prong, which requires examining the plausibility of the Com-
mission's interpretation.8 The First Circuit concluded that the
Career Offender Guideline, "read through the prism of
Amendment 506, adopts an entirely plausible version of the
categorical approach that the statute suggests. " '06 Accordingly,
the court validated the revised commentary.107
The Government appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, which granted certiorari °s to resolve the conflict between
circuits as to whether the Sentencing Commission's implemen-
tation of Amendment 506 conflicts with its obligation to "assure
that the guidelines specify a sentence to a term of imprisonment
9Id at 1400.
" See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1988); see also supra note 53 (discussing Chevron).
101 LaBonte, 70 F.3d at 1407.
"0 Id. at 1406.
103
104 Id,
105 Id. at 1407.
"'oId.
107 md
'00 United States v. LaBonte, 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996). See supra note 77 (citing con-
flicting cases).
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at or near the maximum term authorized for categories of [ca-
reer offenders] ."10
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. MAJORIY OPINION
In an opinion authored by Justice Clarence Thomas,'" the
Court invalidated Amendment 506.111 The Court held that 28
U.S.C. § 994(h) unambiguously requires a court, when sentenc-
ing a career offender, to impose the maximum prison term
available for the offense of conviction, including all applicable
statutory enhancements. In doing so, the Court reversed the
decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals. 3
Justice Thomas acknowledged the broad discretion dele-
gated to the Sentencing Commission in formulating sentencing
guidelines. 4 However, he noted that this discretion "must bow
to the specific directives of Congress.",1 5 As such, Justice Tho-
mas explained, if Amendment 506 is "at odds with § 994(h)'s
plain language, it must give way."
116
Justice Thomas adopted the premise that, "in drafting this
legislation, Congress said what it meant."1 7 Citing Webster's and
Black's Law Dictionaries, he determined that, under the "ordinary
meaning" of "maximum term authorized," the phrase should be
construed as "requiring the 'highest' or 'greatest' sentence al-
lowed by statute.""8 Given that Congress expressly provided en-
hanced maximums for certain repeat offenders "in an effort to
treat them more harshly," Justice Thomas reasoned it is insuffi-
cient merely to identify the basic penalty associated with an of-
fense when calculating the highest sentence allowed by
statute."19  Rather, he concluded, "[w]here Congress has en-
"9 United States v. LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. 1673 (1997).
"'Justice Thomas was joined by Chief Justice Rhenquist and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy and Souter.










acted a base penalty for first-time offenders or nonqualifying
repeat offenders, and an enhanced penalty for qualifying repeat
offenders, the 'maximum term authorized' for the qualifying
repeat offender is the enhanced, not the base, term."
20
Justice Thomas then discredited the respondents' argu-
ments.12 First, he rejected the respondents' attempt to broadly
construe the phrase "categories of defendants" as encompassing
all repeat offenders, including those who are ineligible for sen-
tence enhancements. 22 According to Thomas, the statute con-
templates two distinct categories of repeat offenders for each
possible crime: those who receive notice under 21 U.S.C. §
851 (a) and those who do not.23 Under this construction, the
maximum term for the category of defendants who receive no-
tice is the enhanced term.24 By contrast, the respondents' read-
ing essentially precludes a sentencing court from ever imposing
the enhanced maximum penalty, thereby rendering the en-
hanced penalty provisions a "virtual nullity." 125
Next, Justice Thomas considered the statutory phrase "at or
near the maximum. ", 26 Respondents claimed the words "at or
near" allow for flexibility in sentencing, and therefore justified
the Sentencing Commission's reliance on the unenhanced
statutory maximum.127 While acknowledging that the phrase
does afford latitude in deciding how "near" the sentence must
be to the enhanced maximum, Thomas argued that it does not
"license the Commission to select as the relevant 'maximum
term' a sentence that is different from the congressionally
authorized maximum term."
128
Finally, Justice Thomas discounted the respondents' reli-
ance on the Sentencing Commission's stated justifications2 for
12' Id. at 1677-78.
121 Id. at 1678-79.
'








128 Id. Justice Thomas believed the pertinent issue "is not how close the sentence
must be to the [enhanced] statutory maximum, but to which statutory maximum it
must be close." Id. (quoting United States v. Fountain, 83 F.3d 946, 952 (8th Cir.
1996)).
"2 See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 88
28 US.C . § 994(h)
Amendment 506.'s° In response to the Commission's assertion
that applying the unenhanced maximum "avoids unwarranted
double counting" of the offender's prior convictions, Justice
Thomas stated that, as long as the Commission's mechanism
"results in sentences 'at or near' the 'maximum term author-
ized,"' the number of steps required to achieve this is unimpor-
tant.13' Likewise, he found unavailing the Commission's
contention that Amendment 506 "eliminates 'unwarranted dis-
parity associated with variations in... seeking enhanced penal-
ties.", 32  The Commission noted that two defendants with
identical criminal records and identical offense characteristics
could be subject to two different sentences, depending on
whether the prosecution filed notice of its intention to seek en-
hanced penalties.'3 3 In response, Justice Thomas reasoned that
such discretion is similar to the discretion a prosecutor exercises
when deciding what charges to file, and is therefore "an integral
feature of the criminal justice system."'s' For these reasons, Jus-
tice Thomas invalidated Amendment 5 0 6 .135
B. JUSTICE BREYER'S DISSENTING OPINION
Writing for the dissent,3 6 Justice Breyer found the statutory
words of 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) ambiguous, and thus deferred to
the Sentencing Commission's interpretation. 37 Justice Breyer
concluded that § 994(h) does not "directly [speak] to the pre-
cise.., question at issue. '38s Therefore, Amendment 506 should
be upheld because it is based upon a "permissible construction
of the statute."'39
Justice Breyer analyzed § 994(h) and Amendment 506 from
the perspective that the Commission is faced with the "some-
times conflicting" goals of reducing disparity, achieving propor-
,







"6Justice Breyer was joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsberg.
,17 LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. at 1679-80 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
" Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). That is, the phrase "at or near the statutory maxi-
mum" demands an answer to the question, "authorized by what>" See Chevron U.SA.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1991).
... LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. at 1680 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
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tionality in sentencing, and creating an administrable system. 40
Further, he observed that, under the rule established in Chevron,
it is not the Court's duty to question the wisdom of the Commis-
sion's interpretation. 4 1 Rather, the Court must determine only
whether the statute's words are open to this interpretation.1
4 2
In this context, Justice Breyer analyzed the words of the Ca-
reer Offender Guideline to determine whether they "unambi-
guously forbid" the Commission's implementation of
Amendment 506.143 Observing that the phrase "maximum term
authorized" does not indicate the specific sentencing statute to
which it refers,4 Justice Breyer mentioned several theoretical
possibilities. He noted, for example, that the statute authoriz-
ing a sentence for a probation-violator up to the maximum ini-
tially available for the underlying crime 145 could theoretically
apply, as could the statute authorizing a sentencing judge to
"run" multiple sentences consecutively rather than concur-
rently.4 6 Therefore, Justice Breyer concluded that the words are
ambiguous because they require statutory interpretation to de-
termine their meaning.
147
In addition, neither the Act's background nor § 994(h)'s
legislative history gives meaning to the words "maximum term
authorized."48  By abolishing parole, the Act "transformed the
sentence the judge pronounced from an enormous overstate-
ment into real-time years almost all of which the offender would
actually spend in prison."' 9 To compensate for this discrepancy,
Congress directed the Commission to adjust the sentences to re-
flect the fact that parole had been abolished. 50 Given this con-
text, Justice Breyer found it entirely plausible that "Congress
might indeed have expected that the Commission would read
the career offender subsection to refer to statutory offenses plus
"0 Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
141 Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
1 2 Id. (BreyerJ., dissenting).
'0 1L at 1682-83 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 1682 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
145 Id See 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) (2) (1994).
146 LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. at 1683. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (1994).
,
47 LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. at 1682 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
'48 Id. at 1683-86 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
149 Id. at 1684 (BreyerJ., dissenting) (internal parenthetical phrase omitted).
,so Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). See 28 U.S.C. § 994(m).
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conduct-based [sentence] enhancements alone (without recidi-
vism-based sentence enhancements)."51
Regarding § 994(h)'s legislative history, Justice Breyer ar-
gued that its examination is pointless.52 He noted that the word
"authorized" was originally cross-referenced with another sec-
tion of the Code which specified the "authorized terms of im-
prisonment.'15 3 However, Congress later enacted a technical
amendment eliminating the cross-reference, leaving the word
"authorized" without a specific reference.154 Consequently, Jus-
tice Breyer concluded, it became impossible to determine with
any certainty what "authorized" meant.'--
In closing, Justice Breyer asserted that the structure of the
Act demonstrates congressional intent to delegate to the Com-
mission "the job of interpreting, and harmonizing, the authoriz-
ing Act's specific statutory instructions."' 5 6  As such, the
Commission is free to consider various guidelines in light of the
Act's underlying goals. 7 Given the Commission's expertise in
maneuvering the complexities of the United States Criminal
Code, its decisions merit respect.58 Accordingly, in Justice
Breyer's view, the Sentencing Commission is owed deference
under Chevron,59 and Amendment 506 should be upheld. 6°
V. ANALYSIS
While the Court's invalidation in United States v. LaBonte of
161 ti oAmendment 506 is the correct outcome, this Note argues that
its analysis and reasoning overlooked a procedural error having
important ramifications.
Acknowledged and undisputed by the Court, the commen-
tary added by Amendment 506 represents the Sentencing
Commission's interpretation of the statutory phrase "maximum
.s LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. at 1684 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
"" Id. at 1685 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
113 Id. (Breyer,J., dissenting). See 18 U.S.C. § 3581(b).
114 LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. at 1685 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
"
5 Id. at 1686 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
" Id at 1687 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
,17 Id. (Breyer,J., dissenting).
Id. at 1688 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
"5 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1991).
6 LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. at 1688 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
"' Id. at 1675.
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term authorized."'12 This obvious and seemingly irrelevant ob-
servation is important for three reasons: (1) Amendment 506
amounts to a misuse of commentary and may be invalidated as
such;163 (2) Amendment 506 does not bind federal judges under
Stinson because it cannot be classified as an "interpretive rule;"'6
and (3) although Amendment 506 is substantively analogous to
a "legislative rule,"'r5 it is not binding on federal judges under
Chevron because it was not required to comply with the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act's "notice and comment" provision, and
was not subject to congressional invalidation.'6 As such, the re-
vised commentary is invalid and non-binding, irrespective of
Amendment 506's plausibility or § 994(h)'s ambiguity.167
A. COMMENTARY CANNOT INTERPRET FEDERAL STATUTES
As stated by Justice Breyer in the first sentence of his dis-
sent, "[t] he United States Sentencing Commission has interpreted
three statutory words--the words 'maximum term authorized'-to
mean 'maximum term of imprisonment authorized for the of-
fense of conviction, not including ... sentencing enhancement
provision[s]' for recidivists.' ' 68 Justice Thomas also acknowl-
edged in the majority opinion that the commentary interpreted
§ 994(h), concluding that the Commission's "interpretation is in-
consistent with § 994(h)'s plain language."'6 However, neither
Justice Breyer nor Justice Thomas addressed the Commission's
procedural error in implementing Amendment 506: interpret-
ing a federal statute is not one of the three permissible func-
tions of commentary.170
Though not suggested by either the majority or dissent, it
could be argued that Amendment 506 is the Commission's in-
terpretation of the Career Offender Guideline phrase "offense
statutory maximum," rather than § 994(h). Under this conten-
'62 Id. at 1677.
163 See infta note 170 and accompanying text.
'6' Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1993).
65 Id. at 45.
" 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(p), (x) (1994). See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
167 See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
6 LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. at 1679 (quoting USSG § 4B1.1, cmt., n.2) (emphasis added).
169 Id. at 1675 (emphasis added).
170 USSG § 1B1.7. As noted, commentary's three functions are: interpreting or ex-
plaining a guideline; suggesting circumstances which warrant a departure from a
guideline; and providing background information. See supra note 62.
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tion, the commentary serves a permissible function-interpret-
ing a guideline.1 7' However, this argument is incorrect: The
commentary defines "offense statutory maximum;" it does not in-
terpret it. This distinction is important. Whereas interpretation
implies ascertaining meaning "from" something,1 72 definition
implies providing meaning "to" something. The former is ex-
planation,1 74 the latter is legislation. Legislating is reserved for
the Guidelines.75
Put another way, Amendment 506 amounts to a "legislative
rule" rather than an "interpretive rule" because it interprets a
federal statute rather than the Commission's own Guideline.'7 6
When a statute authorizes an agency to impose a duty, "the for-
mulation of that duty becomes a legislative task entrusted to that
agency.', 77 Clearly, § 994(h)-the Commission's authorization
to impose a sentencing duty onjudges' 78-- and the commentary
added by Amendment 506 is the "formulation of that duty."
17
That is, Amendment 506 imposes a duty on judges to sentence
career offenders at or near the unenhanced statutory maxi-
mum." Therefore, because the commentary is intended to
bind federal judges, it is "the clearest possible example of a leg-
islative rule."''
The Court could have (and should have) ended its analysis
at this point, and invalidated the revised commentary as an im-
permissible use of commentary, regardless of its reasonableness
or § 994(h)'s ambiguity.8 2
'. USSG § IB1.7.
'' The word "interpret" means "to explain the meaning" of something. WEBSmaR's
NE wWORLD DICIONARY 706 (3d College ed. 1988).
' The word "define" means "to state the meaning" of something. Id. at 362.
', See supra note 172.
" See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1993); see also supra notes 44-46
and accompanying text.
7 Stinson, 508 U.S. at 44-45.
' Hoctor v. United States Dep't of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 169 (7th Cir. 1996).
7 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (1994). The Commission is authorized to impose a duty on
judges to sentence career offenders "at or near" the statutory maximum. IM
' See USSG § 4B1.1, cmt., n.2 (1994).
10 Rd.
Hoctor, 82 F.3d at 169.
182 See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44-45 (1993).
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B. STINSON SHOULD NOT BE CONTROLLING
The Court's holding in Stinson v. United States-commentary
which "interprets or explains a guideline" is authoritative unless
it violates or is inconsistent with the Constitution or a federal
183 11
statute 3 is limited to "interpretive rules.1 84  As such, the
Commission's promulgation of a legislative rule through com-
mentary has an additional consequence: Justice Thomas should
not have applied the Stinson rule in assessing the validity of
Amendment 506.1' While Amendment 506 is undoubtedly
commentary,18 it interprets a federal statute (28 U.S.C. §
994(h)) rather than a guideline. Therefore, Amendment 506
falls outside Stinson's purview.
87
The Court's analysis of Amendment 433 in Stinson but-
tresses this point.'8 The primary rationale for according "con-
trolling weight" to the Commission's interpretation of its own
guidelines is that the Commission "is in a superior position to
determine what it intended when it issued a [guideline], how
and when it intended the [guideline] to apply, and the inter-
pretation of the [guideline] that makes the most sense given the
[Commission's] purposes in issuing the [guideline] ."'9
In Stinson, the Court determined that the Sentencing
Commission, as the drafter of the guideline defining "crime of
violence," ' 90 was in a superior position to determine whether the
offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon'91 was in-
tended to fit within the definition of crime of violence. 92 In
contrast, the commentary added by Amendment 506 interprets
language drafted by Congress (the words "at or near the offense
statutory maximum") 93 Obviously, the Commission is not in a
18 Id
,84 Id at 45.
18. See United States v. LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. 1673, 1677 (1997).
116 USSG § 4B1.1, cmt., n.2 (1994).
,6 Stinson, 508 U.S. at 44-45.
' Id at 42-47.
Iad at 45. See KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINSTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 6.10, at 282 (3d ed. 1994); see alsoJohn Manning, Constitutional Structure
andJudicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 614
(1996).
"0 Stinson, 508 U.S. at 44; see also USSG § 4B1.2(1) (ii).
191 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1994).
192 Stinson, 508 U.S. at 47.
... 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (1994).
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superior position to determine what Congress intended. Conse-
quently, the rationale for giving "controlling weight" to com-
mentary does not apply to the commentary added by
Amendment 506.9
C. COMMENTARY AS A "LEGISLATIVE RULE": THE PROBLEM WITH
CHEVRON
The commentary added by Amendment 506 assumes the
role of a Guideline: It represents the Commission's "construc-
tion of a federal statute it administers."' 95 As such, it functions
as a legislative rule.0 6 Under this analogy, judicial deference
would be governed by the two-part Chevron standard.97 Though
Justice Breyer applied the Chevron standard in his LaBonte dis-
sent,'9 this approach is implausible.
Chevron deference is accorded only if the agency rule is pro-
cedurally valid.'"0 A rule is procedurally valid only if it complies
with the Administrative and Procedure Act's "notice and com-
ment" requirement,2°° which allows interested persons to "com-
municate their concerns in a comprehensive and systematic
fashion to the legislating agency., 20' Since Congress subjects
Guidelines to "notice and comment," it follows that if the com-
mentary added by Amendment 506 is to be treated as a Guide-
line, it must observe this requirement. 2 The Amendment did
not observe this requirement, as commentary is exempt from
"notice and comment."20 3 Therefore, the commentary cannot
'9' See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 45.
... Id. at 44.
"16 d.
7 Chevron U.S., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1991); see supra note 53 for the two-part standard.
.. United States v. LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. 1673, 1680 (1997) (BreyerJ., dissenting).
"' Hoctor v. United States Dep't of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 171 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting
that the "notice and comment" procedure is mandatory for legislative rules).
:' 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)-(c). "Notice and comment" requires a promulgating agency
to give public notice of its proposed rulemaking and allow for public comment. Id. §
553(b). If the agency decides to promulgate the rule after receiving the comments, it
must set forth the rule's basis and purpose in a public statement. Id. § 553(c).
2" Hoctor, 82 F.3d at 171.
"2 id
"o3 28 U.S.C. § 994(x) (1994).
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be treated analogously to a Guideline, 4 and a court should not
accord it Chevron deference. °5
Viewed in isolation, allowing the Commission to implement
Amendment 506 without this "procedural formality" seems in-
nocuous "in a world in which life is short, resources are limited,
and agencies must address complex issues that have unpredict-
able twists and turns. '206 However, Amendment 506 cannot be
viewed in isolation. Its validity must be assessed in light of its
overarching effect.20 7 The Commission, while well-intentioned,
consciously and deliberately decided to disregard statutory sen-
tence enhancements in interpreting "at or near the maximum
term authorized. 20 8 As a consequence, a sentencing court is
precluded from imposing the enhanced maximum penalty.
209
This action renders the enhanced penalty provisions a "virtual
nullity.,
210
Furthermore, whether the Commission's stated justifica-
tions for disregarding the enhancement provisions are reason-
able is entirely beside the point.21' What is important is the fact
that the Commission effectively invalidated Congress' en-
hancement provisions without giving the public an opportunity
to respond.2 2 As long as their actions can be considered plausi-
ble,213 the Commission is accountable to no one. This is pre-
cisely the situation where public oversight is imperative if the
Commission is to maintain any semblance of credibility.
D. LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS OF LABONTE
The lasting impact of LaBonte may stem more from what the
Court did not hold than from what it did. Because of the
Court's failure to strike down the revised commentary on pro-
cedural grounds, the Court effectively endorsed the Commis-
sion's use of commentary to interpret federal statutes. As long
204 Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44 (1993).
205 See Hoctor, 82 F.3d at 171.
Manning, supra note 189, at 616-17.
07 id.
20 See United States v. LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. 1673, 1678 (1997).209 Id.
2 10 
Id
21 See id at 1679. Justice Breyer focused on this issue in his analysis of Amendment
506.
212 See supra notes 200-01.
212 See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993).
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as the federal statute is "ambiguous" and the, Commission's in-
terpretation is "plausible,"214 the Commission-or any agency for
that matter-may issue this interpretation through commentary.
Essentially, this means that the Commission can issue what
amounts to Guidelines in substance, without complying with the
"notice and comment" requirement or obtaining congressional
approval.
This paves the way for the following scenario: The Commis-
sion may issue a vague and uncontroversial regulation that sur-
vives the six-month congressional review period and "notice and
comment" for the very reason that it lacks controversy. After
surviving the review period, the Commission then may give sub-
stantive and controversial meaning to the regulation through
commentary. Absent a "plainly erroneous" reading of the
guideline or violation of a statute, neither Congress nor courts
nor the public can question the Commission's policy choice. 5
Sound far-fetched? This is precisely what the Commission
attempted in the Career Offender Guideline.1 6 Had 28 U.S.C. §
994(h) been somewhat more ambiguous, it would have suc-
ceeded.
VI. CONCLUSION
In United States v. LaBonte, the Court concluded that
Amendment 506 violates Congress' specific directive to sen-
tence repeat offenders "at or near the maximum term author-
ized., 217 The opinion, while decided correctly, overlooked the
important fact that commentary, no matter how reasonable,
cannot be used to interpret a federal statute. As such, it left
open the door for further abuses by agencies who seek to avoid
accountability by implementing substantive "legislative rules"
under the guise of "interpretive rules." The Court should close
this loophole it has implicitly created.
JEFFREY H. KNox
211 Md at 44.
211 Id. at 38.
216 SeeUSSG §§ 4111.1-1.2.
1' United States v. LaBonte, 117 S. Ct. 1673, 1679 (1997).
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